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Abstract
We re-examine the extent to which personal taxes on dividends are cap-
italised into the equity prices of domestic firms, using data from around
the time of the 1997 UK dividend tax reform, which removed a significant
tax credit for an important group of investors: UK pension funds. The
tax-adjusted CAPM suggests that the impact should depend on an aver-
age of dividend tax rates across all investors, and that UK pension funds
should reduce their holdings of the previously tax-favoured asset: UK equi-
ties. Given that UK pension funds are small relative to the total size of the
world capital market, a small open economy-type argument implies that the
main eﬀect of the reform would be to reduce UK pension funds’ ownership
of UK equities, with little impact on the price of UK equities. We present
evidence which is consistent with these hypotheses. We discuss why pre-
vious research (Bell and Jenkinson, 2002) reached the diﬀerent conclusion
that this tax reform had a large negative impact on UK share prices.
Acknowledgement: This paper is part of the research of the Large Busi-
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen important reforms of dividend taxation in several OECD
countries. In 2003, the USA moved away from a pure classical system, introducing
preferential personal tax rates for dividend income. In 1999, Ireland moved in the
opposite direction, replacing a partial imputation systemwith a classical system, in
which dividend income is taxed at the shareholder’s full marginal income tax rate.
The operation of imputation systems in European Union countries has been held
to be inconsistent with the EU Treaty in a series of rulings by the European Court
of Justice, generally involving discrimination against either foreign shareholders
or foreign corporations. Several EU countries have modified or abandoned their
imputation systems as a result. Both Germany and the UK now tax dividends in
a similar way to the current US system, with dividends subject to personal income
tax, but not taxed at the shareholder’s full marginal income tax rate.1 In Ireland,
Germany and the UK, revenue raised from these dividend tax increases has been
used to finance reductions in the corporate income tax rate.
For any assessment of these reforms, an important question is whether dividend
taxes have any significant eﬀect on corporate investment decisions. The public
economics literature suggests two distinct reasons why dividend taxation may have
little relevance for corporate investment. The ‘new view’ or ‘tax capitalisation’
hypothesis accepts that dividend taxes will be capitalised into share prices, but
emphasises that taxes on dividends will still have no eﬀect on the cost of capital
or investment, if the marginal source of finance used by firms is retained earnings
and the dividend tax rate is constant. The classical statements of this result are in
King (1974) and Auerbach (1979), and the intuition is straightforward. Suppose
that dividend income is taxed at rate m, so that the shareholder gives up net
income of $(1−m) to finance an investment of $1 from retained earnings. When
the return from the investment - say $(1 + r) - is paid out as a dividend, the
shareholder receives $(1 − m)(1 + r), so that the post-tax rate of return (r) is
1For legal reasons linked to bilateral tax treaties, the UK still formally operates a dividend
tax credit. For domestic shareholders this is equivalent to income tax at a preferential rate, and
the remaining tax credit has negligible value for foreign shareholders.
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the same as the pre-tax rate of return. For investment financed from retained
earnings, the dividend tax acts as a cash flow tax, and is neutral with respect to
the investment decision. Of course, this argument does not hold if the marginal
source of finance is new equity, and the return is paid out at least partly in the form
of a dividend.2 It is possible therefore that dividend taxation acts as a disincentive
to investment by immature firms, that are more reliant on new equity finance.3
But since most investment is undertaken by mature corporations and since most of
their investment is financed from retained earnings, dividend taxation is expected
to have only a limited eﬀect on aggregate investment.
A diﬀerent argument that leads to broadly the same conclusion is the ‘tax
irrelevance’ view, which suggests that dividend taxes have little or no eﬀect on
share prices. As first stated by Miller and Scholes (1978), the argument is that
share prices are determined by the trading decisions of large, tax-exempt financial
institutions like pension funds, that do not pay tax on their dividend income. If
the ‘marginal’ shareholder does not pay the dividend income tax, neither stock
market valuations nor value-maximising investment decisions should be influenced
by dividend tax rates. A related argument has been made in the context of small
open economies by Boadway and Bruce (1992). In their model, the rate of return
on domestic investment is determined either by the rate demanded by foreign
shareholders (for capital importers), or the rate available on outbound investment
(for capital-exporters). Both of these rates are determined on the world market
and are unaﬀected by domestic taxes on dividends. Boadway and Bruce do not
explicitly consider the market value of equity, since they assume that the domestic
firm maximises the utility of the domestic shareholder, rather than the market
value. However, where the firm is partly owned by foreign investors, then these
foreign investors are eﬀectively the ’marginal’ shareholders, and the firm’s market
value is independent of domestic taxes on dividends. Fuest and Huber (2000) also
assume that foreign investors are the marginal shareholders.
2Edwards and Keen (1983) made more precise the result that neutrality holds as long as the
marginal source of finance is the same when the investment is made and when the returns are
paid to shareholders (and as long as the dividend tax rate is constant).
3See, for example, Sinn (1991). Recent papers that test predictions of the ‘new view’ include
Auerbach and Hassett (2002, 2005) and Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez (2004, 2005).
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The assumption that share prices depend only on the tax treatment of one
class of investors is diﬃcult to reconcile with asset pricing theories based on op-
timal portfolio allocation by risk averse investors. However the finance literature
provides a model that, at least in a small open economy context, leads to broadly
similar predictions as the model of Boadway and Bruce (1992). This is the tax-
adjusted capital asset pricing model (CAPM), first set out by Brennan (1970), in
which diﬀerent investors may face diﬀerent tax rates on dividend income. This
approach makes no assumption about the identity of ‘the’ marginal shareholder.
In contrast, all investors can be ‘marginal’ in the sense of being just willing to
hold the equity at the ruling market price, even though tax rates may diﬀer both
across investors and across assets. This is possible because they are also concerned
about the risk they bear by holding risky assets. In equilibrium, an investor with
a lower tax rate on a specific asset will tend to hold more of that asset, but at the
cost of holding a less diversified, and hence more risky, portfolio.
In this model, the eﬀect of dividend taxes on share prices depends on an average
of tax rates across all investors. It does not matter that shares in a specific asset
may be held predominantly by one group of shareholders; the relative ownership
of a particular asset across diﬀerent types of investors is irrelevant. What does
matter is the relative total wealth of diﬀerent investors. In the context of a small
open economy, this implies that dividend income taxes on domestic investors are
likely to be irrelevant to the tax capitalisation eﬀect. If firms choose investment to
maximise their stock market valuations, this again implies that domestic dividend
taxation will have little or no eﬀect on investment.4
The 1997 dividend tax reform in the UK provides an interesting opportunity to
test these predictions. As we explain in more detail in section 2, before this reform,
UK pension funds and insurance companies managing pension-related assets could
reclaim part of the corporate income tax paid by firms on the underlying profits,
when they received dividends paid by UK companies. These rebates cost the UK
4If most stock market wealth is controlled either by (domestic or foreign) tax-exempt insti-
tutions or by foreign investors who can avoid paying income tax on dividends paid by domestic
firms, this would further imply the Miller-Scholes view that dividend taxation in general is largely
irrelevant for stock market valuations. However this stronger implication is not needed for the
hypotheses we investigate in this paper.
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government around £5bn per annum, equivalent to about 20% of UK corporation
tax revenue. Before 1997, UK pension funds alone owned around 30% of all UK
equities, and held approximately three quarters of their equity holdings in UK
companies. These rebates were abolished by the new Labour government in its
first Budget in July 1997. The post-tax value of a given cash dividend paid by a
UK firm to a UK pension fund fell by 20%, while other shareholders - both UK
and foreign - were largely unaﬀected by this reform.
Extending the argument of Miller and Scholes (1978) - that share prices are
largely determined by the valuation of domestic financial institutions that own
the largest shares of these assets - to this UK setting, Bell and Jenkinson (2002)
suggested that this reform of UK dividend taxation caused a significant fall in the
value of the UK stock market. To support this claim, they studied the behaviour
of share prices on ex-dividend days - the day on which the owner of the share
ceases to be entitled to a recently announced dividend payment. If UK pension
funds were ‘the’ marginal investors, then the ex-dividend day fall in the market
value of a UK company paying £100 of cash dividends should have been £125
(including the rebate of underlying corporation tax) before the 1997 reform and
£100 after the reform. Equivalently the ‘drop-oﬀ ratio’ (the change in the market
value expressed as a proportion of the cash dividend) should have fallen from 1.25
to 1, a fall of 20%. In contrast, the tax-adjusted CAPM predicts that this reform
of UK dividend taxation should have had essentially no eﬀect on either share prices
or drop-oﬀ ratios. UK pension funds would be expected to reduce their holdings
of UK equities, as the tax advantage that induced them to bear more UK-specific
risk was eliminated. But since UK pension funds are small relative to the world
capital market, this portfolio reallocation should have little or no eﬀect on UK
share prices.
As a first step towards considering more detailed empirical evidence, it is useful
to review movements in the UK stock market index on and after the announcement
of the 1997 tax reform. The FTSE 100 index is presented in Figure 1, between
1995 and 2002. As is well known, there was considerable volatility in the stock
market during this period, with the index almost doubling between 1995 and 1999
4
before falling back. The date of the 1997 tax reform is marked by the vertical
line. If equity valuations had followed the Bell-Jenkinson prediction, then, ceteris
paribus, there should have been a fall of around 20% in the value of the index
on the announcement of the reform. Clearly, this did not happen. Instead the
index continued to rise. It is conceivable that other announcements in Gordon
Brown’s first Budget may have overshadowed the dividend tax reform. However,
it is diﬃcult to think of precedents for announcements of changes in economic
policy producing the required 20% rise in the stock market, at least in developed
countries.
Nevertheless, Bell and Jenkinson (2002) find that the mean drop-oﬀ ratio for
listed UK companies fell significantly after this tax reform, although their central
estimate is from around 1.05 to 0.85. We confirm their finding in our empiri-
cal analysis; however we do not share their conclusion that UK share prices are
determined by the valuations of UK pension funds.
Our doubts about their conclusion are based both on the theoretical claim
that one type of shareholder should be ‘the’ marginal investor in a market where
the same assets are held simultaneously by diﬀerent investors facing diﬀerent tax
rates; and the methodological concerns about inferring the impact of dividend
taxes on share prices from fluctuations in the mean drop-oﬀ ratio, that have been
highlighted recently by Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez (2005). To support this,
we present a more detailed empirical study of the behaviour of ex-dividend day
drop-oﬀ ratios in the UK, both around the 1997 tax reform and over a longer
period. While the mean drop-oﬀ ratio did fall significantly in the second half
of the 1990s, further analysis reveals that this fall was associated with a sharp
increase in the proportion of observations where the share price rose on the ex-
dividend day, generating a negative value for the drop-oﬀ ratio. It is not clear how
this development could be related to the dividend tax reform. A similar pattern
was observed in the late 1980s, with the mean drop-oﬀ ratio being low and the
proportion of observations with negative values being high in the period after the
1987 stock market crash. There were no changes to the tax treatment of UK
pension funds that could explain these patterns in the late 1980s. In line with
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Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez (2005), we conclude that the mean drop-oﬀ ratio in
the UK is too volatile for short term fluctuations around tax reforms to provide
reliable evidence on the eﬀects of dividend taxation on the stock market valuation
of firms.5
In a companion paper, we investigated more directly whether the 1997 UK
dividend tax reform aﬀected the investment behaviour of UK companies, and
found no significant eﬀect.6 Our findings in this paper are consistent with that
result, but also provide an explanation for why there should be no eﬀect of UK
dividend taxation on UK corporate investment. At least in the UK context, this
does not seem to be explained by the standard ‘new view’ argument, which would
imply a significant tax capitalisation eﬀect on share prices. Rather, it appears to
reflect the size of the UK and the openness of its capital market. Consistent with
the tax-adjusted CAPM in a small open economy setting, there is no significant
eﬀect of domestic dividend taxes on UK share prices, and hence no impact on
investment by UK companies.
In the next section we present a brief summary of the UK dividend tax regime
before and after the 1997 reform. Following that, in Section 3 we outline a sim-
ple version of the Brennan (1970) tax-adjusted CAPM model, which serves to
highlight the features of the market which are important in determining prices.
In Section 4, we summarize the empirical predictions of the model and set out
how we implement empirical tests. Section 5 presents the data, and Section 6 the
results. We conclude in Section 7.
2 The Taxation of Dividends in the UK
We briefly summarize the main elements of the dividend tax regime both before
and after 1997.7 From the early 1970s until 1999, the UK operated a partial
5Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez (2005) document similar volatility over time in the behaviour
of the mean drop-oﬀ ratio in the US. Interestingly their estimates show that there was also a
sharp fall in the mean drop-oﬀ ratio in the US in the second half of the 1990s, although there
was no similar tax change in the US that would explain this development.
6Bond, Devereux and Klemm (2005).
7A more detailed description of the tax system is provided in Bond et al (2005), where we
investigate the impact of the 1997 reform on company dividend payments and investment.
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imputation system. On paying a cash dividend, UK firms were obliged to pay a
proportion of the dividend in tax: Advance Corporation Tax (ACT). Subject to
restrictions (principally that the dividend did not exceed UK taxable profit), the
ACT could be credited against the main corporation tax charge, and thus generally
only aﬀected the timing of corporation tax payments. In addition, however, UK
shareholders could also claim a credit against the UK income tax due on the
receipt of the dividend. In general, ACT was charged at the basic rate of income
tax (20% for dividend income in 1997) on the grossed-up dividend (i.e. the cash
dividend plus the ACT). Hence basic rate shareholders were deemed to have paid
tax in full on any dividends received, and consequently did not have to pay any
further tax. Higher rate taxpayers, whose marginal tax rate was 40%, had to pay
additional tax. For a £100 cash dividend, they had to pay tax on the grossed-up
value of £125, i.e. a total of £50, but they could oﬀset against that the £25 tax
credit, leaving them with another £25 to pay.
The crucial element of the tax regime for our purposes is that tax-exempt
UK shareholders were entitled to claim a tax rebate equal to the ACT paid by
the firm. Just before the tax reform in 1997, this was worth 25% of the cash
dividend (equivalent to 20% of the grossed-up dividend). As noted earlier, the
cost of paying this rebate prior to 1997 was around £5 billion per year, around
20% of UK corporation tax revenue.
The 1997 tax reform abolished this cash rebate for UK pension funds, and the
pension-related assets of UK insurance companies. Other tax-exempt sharehold-
ers - charities, non-tax-paying individuals, and holders of tax-advantaged personal
equity plans - were unaﬀected. Some tax treaties also provided for non-UK share-
holders to receive part of the tax credit - worth approximately 6% of the cash
dividend. They too were unaﬀected by the 1997 reform.
In 1999 the system was further reformed. The cash rebate was now abolished
for most other non-tax-paying individuals,8 including those foreign shareholders
that used to receive some benefit.9 The credit rate was halved to 10%, but UK
8Charities received temporary compensation for this loss. Holders of ‘Individual Savings
Accounts’ continued to receive credits until 2004.
9For foreign shareholders this was achieved by halving the tax credit to 10% and applying a
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tax-paying shareholders were unaﬀected, as income tax rates on dividend income
were also reduced. At this time, ACT was also abolished, and new payment
arrangements were introduced for companies paying corporation tax.
3 A Simple Portfolio Model
We present a simple version of the one period tax-adjusted CAPM model of Bren-
nan (1970) which has been widely used to study the case of shareholders with
heterogeneous tax rates.10 The aim here is to identify the eﬀects of diﬀerences
in tax rates, not only across investors, but also across assets for an individual
investor.
There are a large number, N , of investors. Investor i has an endowment of
Xi, which is divided between two risky assets, H and W , and a risk-free asset.
Investor i holds Hi shares at price p in asset H, Wi shares at price q in W , and
the remainder, Bi = Xi−pHi− qWi, in the risk-free asset. Dividends from H and
W , denoted DH and DW , are taxed at rates mHi and mWi respectively, net of any
dividend tax credits. Capital gains are taxed at rate zi for both assets. Interest
income from the risk-free asset is taxed at rate mi. Dividends are assumed to be
known, but the prices of the risky assets at the end of the period, denoted ePH andePW , are stochastic. Random variables are denoted with a tilde - their expected
values at the start of the period are shown without the tilde.
The end-of-period wealth of investor i is eZi, where
eZi = (1 + r (1−mi))Bi
+
³ ePH + (1−mHi )DH − zi ³ ePH − p´´Hi
+
³ ePW + (1−mWi )DW − zi ³ ePW − q´´Wi
= Xi + (1− zi)
n
ρiBi +
h eGH + γHi DHiHi + h eGW + γWi DWiWio (1)
where eGi is the stochastic capital gain on asset i eg. eGH = ePH − p, where r is the
withholding tax of 10%, rather than by formally abolishing the credit.
10See, for example, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1980, 1982), Gordon and Bradford
(1980), Auerbach (1983) and Michaely and Villa (1995).
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risk-free interest rate,
ρi =
(1−mi)r
(1− zi)
(2)
is the tax-adjusted discount rate of investor i, and
γHi =
(1−mHi )
(1− zi)
and γWi =
(1−mWi )
(1− zi)
(3)
are the tax discrimination variables of investor i for assets H and W respectively.
Investors choose H and W to maximise
Vi = Zi −
ϕi
2
var( eZi) (4)
where ϕi is a risk aversion parameter. The form of ϕi is important: we discuss
two special cases below.
The expected value of eZi, denoted Zi, is equal to the expression in (1), with
the stochastic capital gains terms replaced by their expected values. The variance
of eZi is
var
³eZi´ = (1− zi)2 ¡H2i σ2H +W 2i σ2W + 2HiWiσHW¢ (5)
where σ2H , and σ
2
w are, respectively, the variances of ePH and ePW , and σHW is the
covariance.
Assuming an interior solution in which the investor simultaneously holds all
three assets, the investor’s demand for each asset can be derived from the first
order conditions for Hi and Wi , which are:
Hi =
GH + γHi DH − pρi
ϕi(1− zi)σ2H
− WiσHW
σ2H
and Wi =
GW + γWi DW − qρi
ϕi(1− zi)σ2W
− HiσHW
σ2W
(6)
We can use these demand equations to solve for the equilibrium prices, and
rates of return. Suppose there are, in aggregate, H andW shares in the two risky
assets respectively. Define λi = 1/(1−zi)ϕi so that a higher λi implies either lower
risk aversion or a higher capital gains tax rate. Aggregating the first expression
9
for Hi over N investors and rearranging implies
H =
NX
i=1
Hi =
GH
P
λi +DH
P
λiγHi − p
P
ρiλi
σ2H
− σHWW
σ2H
=
P
λi
£
GH + γHDH − pρ
¤
σ2H
− σHWW
σ2H
(7)
where γH and p are weighted averages:
γH =
P
γHi λiP
λi
(8)
and ρ =
P
ρiλiP
λi
(9)
An equivalent expression holds for asset W . Alternatively, we can express the
equilibrium expected return to purchasing a share in H, as
GH + γHDH
p
= ρ+
[σ2HH + σHWW ]
p
P
λi
. (10)
This takes a familiar form: the expected return is equal to the weighted average
return on the risk-free asset, plus an adjustment for risk. The definition of the
weighted average return is discussed below. The risk adjustment depends on the
variance of the end-of-period price of the asset itself and the covariance with the
end-of-period price of the other risky asset, where the weights on these two terms
depend on their relative size in the overall market. If asset H is suﬃciently small
relative toW , then only the covariance term matters. This expression is consistent
with Brennan’s (1970) model of the CAPM with personal taxes and has been the
subject of extensive empirical testing.11
The portfolio choice of investor i depends on his own tax rates relative to that
of other investors. Specifically,
Hi =
λiHP
λi
+
λi
(σ2Wσ2H − σ2HW )
½
(γHi − γH)σ2WDH − (γWi − γW )σHWDW
− (ρi − ρ) (pσ2W − qσHW )
¾
.
(11)
Clearly, investor i will tend to hold more or less of H, depending on whether his
tax parameter, γHi is above or below the weighted average, γH . If, for example,
11See, for example, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1980, 1982), Black and Scholes
(1974), Miller and Scholes (1982), Kalay and Michaely (2000).
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γHi =1.25 and γ
H = 1, as was broadly the case for UK pension funds holding UK
equities before 1997, then pension funds would hold more of this asset. How much
more depends on the risk of the two assets and the investor’s risk aversion, λi.
For example, the more risk averse is the investor (the lower λi), the less would
be the tendency to have additional holdings of this asset in response to favorable
tax treatment. Of course, the tax treatment of the other assets also aﬀect the
holdings of H. Advantageous tax treatment of the return from W or the risk-free
asset relative to a weighted average of other investors (ie. γWi > γW or ρi > ρ)
would reduce holdings of H by investor i.
To examine the eﬀects of diﬀerential taxation further, it is necessary to examine
the weighted average tax rates. It is useful to simplify by assuming that all
investors face the same rate of capital gains tax on all assets, in which case the
weighted averages depend only on the risk aversion parameter, ϕi:
γH =
P
γHi /ϕiP
1/ϕi
and ρ =
P
ρi/ϕiP
1/ϕi
(12)
Now consider two special cases:
(i) all investors have the same degree of risk aversion: ϕi = ϕ for all i. In
this case,
P
λi = N/(1− z)ϕ and γH and ρ reduce to unweighted averages across
all investors. One implication of this is that individual holdings of the risky assets
do not depend on the initial endowment. Consider (11), but setting the tax rates
faced by all investors on each asset to be the same. Then the second term is zero
and Hi = H/N : all investors hold the same number of shares in H. Any diﬀerence
in endowments is reflected only in the holding of the risk-free asset. Of course,
holdings of the risky assets are aﬀected by tax rates; but the fact that holdings
diﬀer across investors is not reflected in the construction of the average tax rates,
which are unweighted. This is because each investor is at a margin and is equally
likely to trade part of the the holding.
A simple alternative to this is:
(ii) risk aversion diﬀers only across endowments: ϕi = ϕ/Xi.12 In this case,
12Of course it is straighforward to allow for diﬀerences in preferences as well as endowments.
For example, ϕi = θi/Xi where θi represents individual preferences.
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the weights for γH and ρ are initial endowments:
γH =
P
γHi XiP
Xi
and ρ =
P
ρiXiP
Xi
. (13)
This is more intuitive; abstracting from diﬀerences in taxes again, holdings of
risky assets are exactly proportional to the endowment since λi/
P
λi = Xi/
P
Xi.
Note though that again the weighted tax rates do not depend on the holdings of
each asset: indeed, the weights for H andW are the same. Suppose investor i has
a tax advantage from H and hence holds a greater proportion of his investment
in H compared to other investors. It is not the case that the weighted average
tax rate for H disproportionately reflects i’s tax rate. As in the previous case,
all investors are at the margin; the diﬀerence from the previous case is that since
holdings are proportional to the endowment, then a wealthier investor would trade
more in response to a change in, say, the expected end-of-period price. As a result,
his tax rate is weighted more.
It is interesting to note the consequences of taxes varying only across investors,
so that mi = mHi = mWi and hence (γHi − γH) = (γWi − γW ) = (ρi − ρ) for all
investors. In this case, investor i would hold more or less than the weighted average
(λiH/
P
λi) holding, depending on whether he faced a relatively high tax rate
(that is, whether γHi ≷ γH), and on the sign of σ2WDH−σHWDW−(pσ2W − qσHW ).
Even in this case, it is therefore generally not true that all investors would divide
their portfolio across assets in the same way. Hence the weights for constructing
the average tax rates would still not be equal to relative holdings of the individual
assets.
However, finally note that from (10), the market valuation of each asset de-
pends only on the tax rates applied to that asset. An implication of this is that
expression (10) is equally valid in considering the price implications of the recent
US dividend tax reform, even though that tax reform applied to dividends from
all equities. The US tax reform reduced the dividend tax rate for US personal
investors. The eﬀect of this on US equity prices depends on how the average tax
rate across all investors in US equities was aﬀected. If the group of US taxpayers
aﬀected was suﬃciently small, relative to tax-exempt US investors and non-US
investors, then again as a first approximation, there would be little or no impact
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on US equity prices.13
We note three qualifications to this simple model. First, we have assumed an
internal solution in which all investors hold all assets. Consider the introduction
of a subsidy to a group of investors on the income from asset H. This will induce
those investors to switch their holdings in favour of H. They will continue to do
so either up to the point at which, at the margin, the gain from the subsidy is
exactly oﬀset by the additional risk they bear by moving away from an optimally
diversified portfolio - this is characterized by (6) - or until those investors have
switched all their holdings to asset H. In practice we do not observe investors
holding only one form of asset, and so (6) seems the most likely equilibrium.
Second, as argued by Miller and Scholes (1978), it may be the case that trading
costs deter some investors responding to small changes in the prices or expected
returns from particular assets. If only a subset of all investors respond to new
information, then at the margin, it is only the tax rates of those "marginal"
investors which will be reflected in the weighted average tax rates. The relevance
of this observation for examining the UK tax reform depends on whether the
weight of UK pension funds should be higher than if all investors were taken into
account. This is a key empirical issue which we address below.
Third, this model ignores trading around the ex-div day. To prevent a tax-
favoured investor holding only asset H cum-div and then diversifying ex-div, it is
necessary to introduce some cost to this trading strategy. For example, there may
be transaction costs, or a risk of unfavorable underlying price movements around
the ex-div day. Michaely and Villa (1995) develop a theoretical model in which
ex-div day trading is allowed but is endogenously limited. Lasfer (1995) presents
empirical evidence that ex-day returns in the UK are not significantly aﬀected
by short-term trading. We follow Bell and Jenkinson (2002) in assuming that an
analysis of UK ex-day returns can in principle identify the impact of dividend
taxation.
13Chetty, Saez and Rosenberg (2005) provide more detail on this US tax reform, and empirical
evidence on its impact on US equity prices.
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4 Empirical Implications
This model suggests two empirical hypotheses about the impact of dividend taxes.
First, the overall eﬀect of dividend taxes on share prices reflects the weighted
average tax rate of all investors, γH . What does this suggest about the impact of
the 1997 UK dividend tax reform on UK share prices? Even taking the second
special case above, UK pension funds control only small proportion of the total
wealth invested in all markets. Any change in their tax rate is therefore likely to
have a negligible eﬀect on UK equity prices. Thus:
Proposition 1 The 1997 tax reform should have little or no eﬀect on the prices
of UK equities.
We test this proposition below using the standard technique of analyzing drop-
oﬀ ratios. When a share goes ex-dividend, marginal shareholders are indiﬀerent
between either selling the share at the cum-dividend price, thus forgoing the div-
idend, or keeping the share and thus receiving the dividend. Denote the cum-div
price by Pc, the ex-div price by Pex, and the dividend by D. Then following Elton
and Gruber (1970), and using (10), we have
Pc − Pex = γD (14)
or
Pc − Pex
D
= γ. (15)
The term on the left hand side of this expression is the drop-oﬀ ratio (DOR):
the fall in the price expressed as a proportion of the dividend. The term on the
right hand side is the tax discrimination variable, described above. The DOR can
therefore be used to estimate the average value of the tax discrimination parameter
γ - which determines the share price.
In practice, we measure Pc at the end of trading on the last day the share trades
cum-dividend, and Pex at the end of trading on the first day the share trades ex-
dividend. Clearly, the diﬀerence between these two prices will reflect not only the
dividend payment, but all other news about the value of the firm that emerges on
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the ex-div day. Averaging across a large number of independent observations on
DORs is therefore required to obtain a useful estimate of γ. Adjustments can also
be made for market movements on ex-div days (see below).
For comparison with Bell and Jenkinson (2002), we follow the same approach
as them in estimating γ. Briefly, assume, following Lakonishok and Vermaelen
(1983), that the price changes are random variables which can be written as
Pc − Pex = θD +  (16)
where the  are independently distributed with
E() = 0 and var() = P 2c σ
2; (17)
that is the standard deviation of the unexplained price change is assumed to be
proportional to the share price. As proposed by Boyd and Jagannathan (1994),
an eﬃcient estimate of γ, before and after the tax reform, can then be found by
estimating
Pc − Pex
Pc
= θ1
D
Pc
+ θ2F
D
Pc
+ e (18)
where
e =

Pc
and hence var(e) = σ2. (19)
In (18), θ1 provides an estimate of γ prior to the tax reform. F is a dummy
variable which takes the value of 0 for observations before the tax reform and 1
for observations after the tax reform; hence θ2 is an estimate of the change in γ
following the tax reform. Based on microstructure models developed by Boyd and
Jagannathan (1994) and Frank and Jagannathan (1998), which suggest a negative
intercept in such a regression, a constant term may also be included.
A further common adjustment is to account for market movements on the ex-
div day multiplied by a historic estimate of the correlation between the return
on the share and the return on the market. That is, we replace Pex with P ∗ex =
Pex − PcβRm where Rm is the return on the market on the ex-day, and β is the
CAPM measure of risk of that equity.
The second empirical prediction concerns holdings of UK equities. Expression
(11) makes clear that, ceteris paribus, any investor will tend to hold more of a
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given asset - say H - when his tax discrimination variable for that asset (γHi ) is
above the average of all investors (γH). As is clear from the discussion above,
until 1997 the value of γ for UK pension funds holding UK equities was 1.25 and
therefore significantly above the average value across all investors. However, after
1997, this value fell to 1. This implies that:
Proposition 2 UK pension funds should hold a disproportionately high share of
UK equities before 1997, but this share should fall after 1997. By contrast, other
investors should hold a disproportionately low share of UK equities before 1997,
but should increase their share after 1997.
To investigate this proposition, we report evidence on the composition of equity
portfolios before and after 1997 for UK pension funds and other institutional
investors, and we report evidence on the share of UK equities held by diﬀerent
classes of investors.
5 Data
We set up our data to mirror as closely as possible the data used by Bell and
Jenkinson (2002), to ensure that any diﬀerences we encounter are not caused by
the samples.
Specifically, we use data from Thomson Financial Datastream on dividend
payments of quoted UK companies. This data set contains one observation per
payment, i.e. typically two observations per firm per year, as most UK firms pay
an interim and a final dividend in each accounting year. We merge daily data
on share prices and return indices into this data set, keeping in each case the
observation on the day when the share first trades ex-dividend and on the day
before, i.e. the ex-dividend and cum-dividend prices.
Before running regressions, we clean the resulting data sets as follows. We
drop any observations where core data are missing, such as the payment date,
the ex-dividend date, the (cum- or ex-dividend) share price or the value of the
dividend. We also drop observations where the last cum-dividend observation
predates the ex-dividend observation by more than 5 trading days. We drop a few
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observations for which we cannot work out the accounting year end date, because
we need this in order to match the dividend payment data with information from
company accounts. After matching the data with company accounts, we drop all
firms for which the sum of individual dividend payments over the year does not
match up with the total dividend payment reported in the accounts. Then we
drop all dividend payments that were designated as Foreign Income Dividends,
as the tax treatment for this form of dividends was diﬀerent. We also drop any
observation for which the share price did not move on the ex-dividend date, which
suggests that there was no trading. Finally we drop outliers, which we define as
DORs in excess of 5.
As explained above, we adjust returns for general market movements using the
CAPM. To allow comparisons with BJ, we follow their approach in estimating
the correlation of each share’s monthly returns with market returns (β). We thus
run separate regressions of each share’s monthly return (including capital gains
and dividends) on the monthly return of the FTSE All-Share index during the 5
years preceding the tax reform. We only keep shares with at least 36 historical
observations.
The cleaning procedure used by BJ is virtually the same as ours, except that
they did not delete data where the sum of dividend payments diﬀered from the
figure reported in company accounts, and they did not drop outliers as defined
above. Hence our sample is slightly smaller than theirs, with data on 7966 dividend
payments by 1275 firms.
6 Results
This section first presents empirical evidence on the behavior of drop-oﬀ ratios
in the UK. It then briefly considers evidence on UK equity ownership. Bell and
Jenkinson (2002), henceforth BJ, use the 1997 reform to test whether taxes aﬀect
the valuation of dividends and to attempt to find the identity of what they refer
to as “the” marginal shareholder. We first replicate their main findings using our
sample, confirming that the mean drop-oﬀ ratio did fall significantly in the UK
in the late 1990s. We then look in more detail at the nature and timing of this
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change in the distribution of drop-oﬀ ratios, and consider fluctuations in the mean
drop-oﬀ ratio over a longer horizon.
6.1 Bell and Jenkinson (2002) replication
Table 1 presents the results obtained from estimating mean drop-oﬀ ratios for pre-
reform and post-reform periods in a similar way to BJ, based on OLS estimation
of equation (18). Columns 1 and 2 reproduce the results from BJ; columns 3 and
4 present our replications. Like BJ, we compare the 30 month period before the
1997 tax reform with the 30 month period after the reform. Following BJ, we
report results for the sample of all firms and for the sub-sample of the largest 250
firms. Our results are very similar to those obtained by BJ. While we estimate
a smaller fall than BJ, we confirm that there was a significant fall in the mean
drop-oﬀ ratio in the UK after July 1997, particularly for larger firms.
We implemented a number of robustness checks, which suggested that these
results are robust. Specifically, we considered the following alternative specifica-
tions. (a) Including a constant term to allow for certain ex-dividend day trading
behavior as suggested by microstructure models in Boyd and Jagannathan (1994)
and Frank and Jagannathan (1998): this does not aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients.
(b) Not correcting the ex-div price (Pex) for market movements: this hardly aﬀects
the coeﬃcients and leads to slightly more significant falls in the mean DORs. (c)
Not dealing with heteroskedasticity, i.e. just regressing the DOR on a constant
and a post reform dummy: this does not aﬀect the results for the sample of large
firms. For the full sample, this reduces the estimated fall in the mean DOR by
half. The estimated fall in this case is only significant at the 13% level.
Before extending the investigation, it is worth discussing the interpretation of
these results. It is true that the estimated change in the mean DOR, at least
for the larger companies, is close to the theoretical drop in the value of γ for UK
pension funds: 20% (BJ) or 17% (our results) as against 20% in theory. However, if
pension funds were “the” marginal shareholders, then the estimated levels of these
mean DORs are not as expected. If pension funds were the marginal shareholders,
the mean DOR should be around 1.25 before the reform and 1 after the reform.
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For the largest firms, the empirical results suggest a mean DOR of around 1 before
the reform and around 0.8 after the reform.
Of course, based on the asset pricing model set out in Section 3, we would
not expect the mean DOR to reflect only the tax rates of UK pension funds, but
rather an average across all investors in UK equities. While the levels of the mean
DORs before and after the reform could reflect an average across investors, from
this perspective, the significant fall in the mean DOR is more surprising.
6.2 Drop-oﬀ ratios and dividend yields
BJ also consider changes in the mean DOR for sub-samples divided by dividend
yields. The 1997 tax reform aﬀected those shareholders with the highest valuation
of UK company dividends. In the presence of clientele eﬀects, highly taxed in-
vestors would be expected to hold shares in low-dividend-paying firms, and lightly
taxed (or subsidized) investors would be expected to hold shares in high-dividend-
paying firms. This suggests that, before 1997, UK pension funds were more likely
to be “the” marginal shareholders for UK firms with relatively high dividend
yields. If this were the case, then the 1997 reform is expected to have most impact
on the mean DOR for high-dividend-paying firms.
BJ report results that appear to support such clientele eﬀects. Specifically they
use annual data on dividend yields to divide their observations in the pre-reform
and post-reform periods, separately, into quintiles. They then compare the mean
drop-oﬀ ratio for each quintile in the pre-reform period with the mean drop-oﬀ
ratio for the corresponding quintile in the post-reform period. We replicate these
results in Table 2.14 Like BJ, we find that the mean DOR fell significantly only
when comparing observations with relatively high dividend yields, although it is
not the case that observations in the top quintile had the largest or most significant
drop.
Given that the rationale for splitting the sample by dividend yields is based on
the tax preference of UK pension funds for a high dividend yield in the pre-reform
14Unlike BJ, we present results based on individual dividend payments, rather than artificial
portfolios made up of all dividend payments on the same day. BJ state that results were similar
in both cases.
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period, it would seem more appropriate to divide the full sample into quintiles
based on dividend yields in the pre-reform period only. We use data on average
dividend yields in the pre-reform period to divide our sample of firms into quintiles.
We then compare the mean drop-oﬀ ratio for each quintile in the pre-reform period
with the mean drop-oﬀ ratio for the same sub-sample in the post-reform period.
Unlike the procedure used by BJ, this ensures that we are comparing mean drop-oﬀ
ratios for the same firms in the two sub-periods.
Table 3 presents these results. When the samples are classified in this way, it
is notable that the fall in the mean drop-oﬀ ratio becomes small and statistically
insignificant for the sub-sample with the highest dividend yields in the pre-reform
period. The clear pattern in the behavior of drop-oﬀ ratios by dividend yields
reported by BJ is thus quite sensitive to the precise way in which their sub-
samples were chosen. Moreover, and regardless of the method used to select the
sub-samples, we can note that the pattern of estimated mean drop-oﬀ ratios in
the pre-reform period provides little support for the view that the tax treatment
of UK pension funds was particularly important for the stock market valuation of
UK firms with relatively high dividend yields.15
6.3 Evidence on the distribution of DORs
To investigate the behavior of DORs further, we now consider the distribution
of DORs. The 1997 tax reform reduced the tax discrimination parameter γi for
the class of shareholders which previously had the highest valuation of dividends.
If UK pension funds were indeed “the” marginal investors for certain types of
UK firms, the fall in the mean DOR reported in Table 1 should be associated
with compression in the upper part of the distribution of DORs. Essentially, the
highest values of γi were eliminated by the tax reform, while lower values of γi
were unaﬀected.
To examine this prediction, Figure 2 plots various quantiles of the distribution
of DORs over the same sample period used in Table 1. In fact we see the opposite
pattern, with the fall in the mean DOR after 1997 being associated with a fall in
15Consistent with this, we find that the simple correlation coeﬃcient between the DOR and
the dividend yield in the pre-reform period is less than 1%.
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drop-oﬀ ratios at the bottom end of the distribution. The upper quartile increases
from 1.3 in 1995 to 1.4 in 1999, with no sign of any reduction following the 1997 tax
reform. In contrast, the bottom decile falls steadily throughout this period, from
0.1 in 1995 to -0.6 in 1999. This indicates that there was a considerable increase in
the proportion of observations with negative drop-oﬀ ratios. A negative drop-oﬀ
ratio is found when the firm’s share price increases (relative to the market) on
the ex-dividend day, notwithstanding the loss of the entitlement to the dividend
payment. We discuss this development further below, but note that shifts at the
bottom end of the distribution of DORs are not easily explained by the change in
the tax treatment of UK pension funds. More generally, Figure 3 shows that the
distribution of DORs widened after 1997, while diﬀerences in the tax treatment of
diﬀerent classes of investors were reduced. This suggests that developments other
than the 1997 tax reform may have been the dominant influence on the behavior
of UK drop-oﬀ ratios during this period.
6.4 Further evidence on timing
We now extend the analysis to consider more carefully the timing of these changes
in the mean drop-oﬀ ratio, and the longer term evidence. Following BJ, our
regression analysis in Tables 1-3 neglected precise timing issues, as there was just
one post-reform dummy: the test compared a 30 month period before the reform
with a 30 month period after the reform. In order to see more precisely when the
fall in the mean DOR occurred, we can estimate the mean DOR for 6 month and
12 month periods. To maintain comparability with the previous results, we again
use the GLS estimation procedure explained in Section 4. Table 4 presents these
estimates of mean DORs for each year and half-year from 1995 to 1999.
The annual estimates suggest that the mean DOR did not fall significantly until
1999, although the tax reform was implemented in July 1997. The six monthly
estimates suggest that there was a marked fall in the second half of 1997. However
they also show that there was a larger increase in the mean DOR in the second
half of 1998, which stops this showing up in the annual estimate for 1998. Indeed
the mean DOR in the second half of 1998 is the highest found for any of these
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six-month periods. This indicates that there are substantial fluctuations in these
estimates of mean DORs, which may have little to do with tax changes.
To explore this further, we consider longer term evidence. Figure 2 plots
annual and six-monthly estimates of mean DORs between 1988 and 2000.16 Our
original sample period is marked here by the two vertical bars, with the tax reform
occurring in the middle of that period.
This evidence confirms that the behavior of the mean DOR in the UK is indeed
erratic. There is a sharp increase from 1988 to 1991, which is not explained by
any change in the tax treatment of UK pension funds. Both the fraction of equity
owned by tax-exempt institutions (see below) and their tax treatment were stable
over this period. The tax discrimination parameter γ for UK pension funds fell
from 1.33 in 1992 to 1.25 in 1994, when the rate of the refundable dividend tax
credit was reduced from 25% to 20%. However we see that there was no fall in
the mean drop-oﬀ ratio for UK companies over this period. The period studied by
BJ is thus unique in showing an association between a significant fall in the mean
DOR and an increase in dividend taxation for UK pension funds. Furthermore,
the mean DOR at the end of this period, in the second half of 2000, is very similar
to that at the start of the period, in the first half of 1988, although the relevant
tax discrimination parameter for UK pension funds had fallen from 1.33 to 1.
These fluctuations in the mean drop-oﬀ ratio appear to be associated with
changes at the bottom end of the distribution, and in particular with the fraction
of observations where the drop-oﬀ ratio is negative. Table 5 reports annual figures
for the share of observations with negative drop-oﬀ ratios. This fraction falls
sharply from 1988 to 1991 and increases sharply towards the end of the 1990s,
mirroring the fluctuations in the mean drop-oﬀ ratio shown in Figure 2. Negative
values for the drop-oﬀ ratio - observations where the share price increases despite
the share going ex-dividend - seem to be most common in periods when the stock
market is both volatile and rising. This was the case immediately after the 1987
stock market crash, and again during the dot com bubble period of the late 1990s.
These developments in the tail of the distribution of drop-oﬀ ratios appear to exert
16Unfortunately we do not have the required data on dividend payments to calculate DORs
before 1988.
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a strong influence on the behavior of the estimated mean.
The behavior of the mean drop-oﬀ ratio in the US provides further grounds for
doubting whether the fall in the UK emphasized by BJ was related to the 1997 UK
dividend tax reform. Estimates presented in Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez (2005)
show that the mean DOR in the US also fell sharply over the period studied by BJ,
from around 0.8 in 1994 to around 0.4 in 2000, with the sharpest fall also occurring
from 1999 to 2000. Using data over the period 1963-2004, Chetty, Rosenberg and
Saez show that such fluctuations in the mean DOR in the US are not uncommon,
and display little relationship with changes in dividend taxation. Our evidence
for the UK supports their conclusion: estimates of mean drop-oﬀ ratios are too
volatile to provide reliable evidence about the impact of dividend taxes on the
stock market valuation of firms.
6.5 Equity ownership
The second proposition discussed in Section 4 concerned the share of UK equities
in the portfolios of UK pension funds. This share is expected to fall after the
July 1997 tax reform eliminated a major tax advantage for UK pension funds of
dividends from UK companies. This prediction also applies to the holdings of
UK insurance companies insofar as they relate to the provision of pension plans,
although not to the provision of life insurance.
Table 6 reports the proportion of UK equities in the total equity holdings of UK
pension funds, insurance companies and unit trusts between 1990 and 2001. The
UK share of pension fund equity portfolios did indeed fall sharply, from around
three quarters at the end of 1996 to around two thirds by the end of 2001, having
been quite stable during the first half of the 1990s. The UK share of insurance
company equity portfolios also fell, from around 80% to around 75%, having also
been stable in the period before this tax reform. In contrast, for unit trusts -
mutual funds whose tax treatment did not change at all in 1997 - there was a
temporary increase in the UK share of their equity holdings immediately after the
tax reform, although this has since returned to its pre-reform level. This indicates
that the change in the composition of equity portfolios observed for UK pension
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providers was not common to all UK institutional investors during this period.
The smaller fall for insurance companies relative to pension funds is consistent
with the tax change aﬀecting only part of insurance company portfolios.
Table 7 reports estimates of the fraction of total UK quoted equity owned
by diﬀerent types of shareholders, for the years between 1990 and 2000 for which
these estimates are available. The last observation before the July 1997 tax reform
refers to the end of 1994, when UK pension funds owned 28% of equity quoted on
the London stock exchange. This share fell to 18% by the end of 2000, although
it is not possible to date precisely the timing of this fall. The share owned by UK
insurance companies has been much more stable. This suggests that the fall in
UK equity as a share of insurance company total equity holdings, shown in Table
6, reflected an increase in the total size of their portfolios rather than a fall in their
holdings of UK equity. The fall in the share of UK equity owned by UK pension
funds was accompanied by an increase in the share of UK equity owned by foreign
shareholders, which rose from 16% at the end of 1994 to 32% by the end of 2000.
While this was partly a continuation of a longer term trend, it seems likely that
this increase in foreign ownership of UK equity was given further impetus by the
reduced attractiveness of UK equity to UK pension funds after the abolition of
refundable dividend tax credits in July 1997.
As we discussed in Section 3, the eﬀect on the valuation of UK equities would
depend on the size of the premium required by foreign investors to increase their
exposure to UK-specific risks. A negligible change in this risk premium is consis-
tent with the absence of any noticeable eﬀect on the level of the UK stock market
(Figure 1). At first sight this is inconsistent with the change in the mean drop-oﬀ
ratio after 1997 emphasized by BJ, but as discussed earlier in this section, there
are reasonable grounds for doubting whether this fall in the mean drop-oﬀ ratio
was driven by the change in the tax treatment of UK pension providers.
7 Conclusions
This paper explores the extent to which dividend taxes are capitalised into share
prices, using information derived from a significant UK tax reform. When diﬀerent
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investors are subject to diﬀerent tax rates, the Capital Asset Pricing Model sug-
gests that the market valuation of equity should depend on an average of tax rates
across all investors. In the context of the UK, the model suggests that all investors
that hold both UK equities and other assets are marginal, with diﬀerences in tax
treatments just oﬀset by diﬀerences in exposure to risks at the optimal portfolio
allocations. Moreover, since the wealth invested by UK pension providers is small
relative to the size of the world capital market, as a first approximation we would
expect a change in the tax treatment of UK pension funds to have little or no ef-
fect on the pricing of UK equities. The first-order eﬀects of this tax reform should
instead be seen in a shift in the composition of pension providers’ portfolios away
from UK equities. This aﬀects equity prices only to the extent that other investors
- notably foreign investors - require a higher risk premium to take up additional
holdings of UK equity.
The abolition of refundable dividend tax credits in July 1997 represented a
substantial increase in the taxation of dividends paid by UK companies to UK
pension funds and UK insurance companies providing pension plans. Bell and
Jenkinson (2002) argued that this tax reform had a substantial impact on the
stock market valuation of dividends paid by UK firms, implying that UK pension
providers were ‘the’ marginal investors in UK equity, at least in the period before
the tax reform. However, we question this conclusion, which is not consistent
with the CAPM We confirm that there was a fall in the mean drop-oﬀ rate after
1997, but question whether it can confidently be attributed to the abolition of
refundable dividend tax credits for UK pension funds. The largest fall occurred in
1999, some eighteen months after the tax reform. While the tax change aﬀected
investors with the highest valuation of UK dividends, the main change occurred in
the lower tail of the distribution of drop-oﬀ ratios. As in the US, the mean drop-
oﬀ ratio in the UK is shown to fluctuate erratically over a longer time period.
Indeed the period studied by Bell and Jenkinson (2002) appears to be unique in
showing an association with changes to the tax treatment of UK pension funds.
Interestingly, Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez (2005) have shown that there was also
a sharp fall in the mean drop-oﬀ ratio in the US in late 1990s. Presumably this
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fall in the US was not driven by the tax treatment of UK pension funds; though it
may have been driven by factors that were common to the US and the UK stock
markets during this dot com bubble period.
We share the skepticism of Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez (2005) about the use
of mean drop-oﬀ ratios to test hypotheses about the impact of dividend taxation.
Mean drop-oﬀ ratios are simply too volatile to attach causal significance to short-
run fluctuations around tax reforms.
We report evidence on the ownership of UK equities that are consistent with
the predicted changes to the composition of UK pension fund portfolios after
this tax reform in 1997. UK pension funds have reduced their exposure to UK-
specific risks following the abolition of a uniquely favorable tax treatment of UK
dividends. Foreign shareholders have increased their holdings of UK equities over
the same period. Noting the relative size of UK and foreign investors, asset pricing
theory does not suggest that this should have had a major impact on the market
valuation of UK equity. This is consistent with the absence of a crash in the UK
stock market on the announcement of this tax reform; and, in our view, it is also
consistent with a closer examination of the available empirical evidence.
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Table 1: Regression results obtained by BJ and replication 
 BJ 
all firms 
BJ  
largest 250 
Replication 
all firms 
Replication 
largest 250 
Observations 8837 2348 7966 1565 
     
pre 07/97 0.890** 
(0.018) 
1.028** 
(0.027) 
0.904** 
(0.013) 
0.978** 
(0.024) 
Δ post 07/97 -0.106** 
(0.029) 
-0.204** 
(0.041) 
-0.080** 
(0.024) 
-0.168** 
(0.050) 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Results obtained by regressing DORs 
multiplied by D/Pc on D/Pc, and a post-reform dummy multiplied by D/Pc. Stars indicate the level of 
significance (*: 10%, **: 5%). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regression results by dividend yield quintiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Observations 
 
1594 1593 1594 1593 1592 
pre 07/97 0.821 0.834 0.912 0.927 0.917 
 (0.050)** (0.033)** (0.028)** (0.025)** (0.023)** 
Δ post 07/97 -0.021 0.007 -0.114 -0.114 -0.078 
 (0.086) (0.053) (0.051)** (0.040)** (0.043)* 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Results obtained by regressing DORs 
multiplied by D/Pc on D/Pc, and a post-reform dummy multiplied by D/Pc. Sample split by dividend 
yield quintiles before and after reform, where (5) is the top quintile. Stars indicate the level of 
significance (*: 10%, **: 5%). 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regression results by pre-reform dividend yield quintiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Observations 
 
1387 1649 1633 1598 1525 
pre 07/97 0.765 0.859 0.908 0.935 0.910 
 (0.058)** (0.035)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.023)** 
Δ post 07/97 0.014 -0.041 -0.086 -0.122 -0.032 
 (0.081) (0.057) (0.040)** (0.046)** (0.044) 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Results obtained by regressing DORs 
multiplied by D/Pc on D/Pc, and a post-reform dummy multiplied by D/Pc. Sample split by pre-reform 
dividend yield quintiles, where (5) is the top quintile. Stars indicate the level of significance (*: 10%, 
**: 5%). 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated drop-off ratios by year / half-year 
Half year Yearly Half-yearly  
1995h1 .92 
(.02) 
1995h2 
.91 
(.02) .88 
(.03) 
1996h1 .87 
(.03) 
1996h2 
.89 
(.02) .91 
(.03) 
1997h1 .92 
(.03) 
1997h2 
.89 
(.02) .84 
(.04) 
1998h1 .80 
(.04) 
1998h2 
.88 
(.03) .95 
(.04) 
1999h1 .77 
(.06) 
1999h2 
.76 
(.04) .76 
(.04) 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Results obtained by regressing DORs 
multiplied by D/Pc on D/Pc for each year and half-year using the full sample of firms. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Share of negative DORs 
Year 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
Share of 
negative 
DORs 
(%) 
21 14 13 9 15 12 12 9 10 13 15 16 20 
Notes: Calculated for full sample of firms. 
 
Table 6: Share of UK equities in total equity holdings of pension funds, long-
term insurance companies and unit trusts 
 Pension Funds Insurance Companies Unit trusts 
1990 75.0% 80.9% 64.9% 
1991 74.2% 79.6% 62.0% 
1992 76.2% 80.3% 60.4% 
1993 74.9% 78.2% 60.1% 
1994 74.6% 77.9% 56.4% 
1995 75.7% 77.7% 62.1% 
1996 76.6% 79.0% 58.8% 
1997 76.5% 80.5% 66.9% 
1998 75.5% 80.6% 64.6% 
1999 70.7% 76.7% 63.0% 
2000 68.8% 78.6% 59.5% 
2001 67.1% 75.1% 59.2% 
Source: Financial Statistics, tables 5.1A and 5.1B. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Beneficial Ownership of UK equities 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1997 1998 1999 2000 
UK Pension 
Funds 
31.7 31.3 32.4 31.7 27.8 22.1 21.7 19.6 17.7 
UK Insurance 
Companies 
20.4 20.8 19.5 20 21.9 23.5 21.6 21.6 21.0 
Foreign 
Shareholders 
11.8 12.8 13.1 16.3 16.3 24 27.6 29.3 32.4 
Source: National Statistics (2003), table A; end of year figures. No data available for 1995 and 1996. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: FTSE 100 index, 2nd of July 1997 indicated by vertical line. Source: 
Thomson Financial Datastream 
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Figure 2: The distribution of estimated DORs 
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Figure 3: DORs from 1988 to 2000 
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Notes: Results obtained by regressing DORs multiplied by D/Pc on D/Pc for each year and half-year 
using the full sample of firms. 
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